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INTRODUCTION  ket structure  can be  maintained concurrent  with
a patent  system.  The  first  is  public  perception.
This  paper  examines  the  issues  surrounding  The patent  is not viewed  as government  regula-
the patenting of life forms, specifically  the social  tion with a purpose,  but as a fundamental part of
and private costs  and benefits  of the Plant  Vari-  the institution of private property;  not as the cre-
ety Protection Act (PVPA) (Plant Variety Protec-  ation of a statutory  monopoly,  but as protection
tion  Act,  1970).  The  PVPA  is  a  current  issue,  against theft.  The  second reason  lies in the eco-
encompassing  all the elements  of the economic,  nomic justification  for government  intervention:
social,  and  moral  controversy  aroused  by  the  whenever  the private  marginal  value product  is
broader  issue of patenting  life forms generally.  less than the social marginal value product of an
The  subsequent  sections  of the  paper  outline  activity,  and  the  private  marginal  cost  exceeds
the  specific  issues  surrounding  the  PVPA,  dis-  the social marginal cost, it behooves the govern-
cuss  the issue  of plant patenting,  present the ar-  ment  to  direct  resources  toward  that  activity,
guments  favoring  and  opposing plant patenting,  since  societal welfare  can be improved.
and,  finally,  present  an analysis  of the  major is-  The  competitive  market  thus  tolerates  gov-
sues of the PVPA.  ernment intervention  when an activity is  charac-
A patent, simply stated,  is the awarding of ex-  terized by the described marginal benefit-cost re-
clusive  ownership  of a  new  invention,  enabling  lationship.  More  to  the  point,  the  government
the  developer  to  obtain  whatever  rewards  that  intervention  encourages  such  activities.  Patent
might  accrue  from  the  invention.  A  govern-  protection,  then,  is  a  means  to  achieve  this
ment-granted  patent  confers  certain  rights  and  end-by temporarily raising the private marginal
privileges on its owner and is considered private  value product to induce the private sector to un-
property.  Patents are thus  a means  of providing  dertake  the desired activity. The PVPA serves to
incentive to  engage in creative  activity,  illustrate  the  costs  and  benefits  of  government
Patent  protection  and  a  competitive  market  intervention  in the form  of patent protection.
structure  have coexisted  as  basic tenets of soci-  The PVPA (P.L. 91-577)  was enacted into law
ety in the United States for nearly 200 years. Yet,  on  December  24,  1970.  Its enactment  was  moti-
the  inherent  characteristics  of patent  protection  vated by a desire to increase the return on private
seem in conflict with conditions necessary for the  research  investment  through enabling  patents  to
efficient  functioning  of  a  competitive  market  be  obtained  for sexually  reproduced  plant vari-
structure.  Patents  may  be barriers  to market en-  eties.I  Amendments  to the original act were pro-
try.  The  number  of buyers  and  sellers  may  be  posed in  1979 to extend the life of the patents and
determined  by the  patent holder through  licens-  to broaden the list of plants eligible for patenting.
ing  or  contractual  arrangements.  Patents  may  When the amendments,  bills H.R. 999 and S.  23,
impede the  flow  of information  and the  mobility  were  first  considered  by  the  House  and  Senate
of factors of production.  By definition,  the inven-  Agriculture  Committees,  the  opposition  became
tion  is  distinct  and  unique;  this  implies  the  ab-  so  intense  that  the  hearings  were  postponed
sence  of existing  comparable  products,  eroding  ("Opposition  to  Seed  Law  Mounts,"  1979).  It
the  assumption  of homogenous  goods.  Further,  was  nearly  one  year later,  June  4,  1980,  before
the  patent  holder  has  been  granted  exclusive  the  House  Agriculture  Committee  passed  the
power to negotiate  contractual  arrangements  re-  amendments  in  a  roll  call  vote  of 35  to  2. The
garding the use  of the product,  thus  enabling an  amendments were passed  by the Congress  in De-
influence  over price.  cember,  1980,  before  the  96th  Congress  ad-
There are two reasons why a competitive  mar-  journed.
Barbara Claffey is an  Agricultural  Economist  with the Food and  Agricultural Policy Branch,  National Economics  Division, Economics,  Statistics, and Cooperatives  Service,
U.S.  Department of  Agriculture.
The  author wishes  to  express  gratitude  for the  assistance  provided  by  several  colleagues.  Ken  Clayton,  James  Johnson,  and  Tom Stucker  offered  many  constructive
comments  throughout  the research.  Michael  Mishoe  provided assistance  with  political  and legislative  background.  J.  B.  Penn deserves  special  thanks for  his many critical
reviews of the entire  manuscript.  The author accepts  all  responsibility for the content of this  paper.
'  The  stated intent of PVPA is to encourage the development  of novel varieties of sexually reproduced  plants, to make  them available to the public,  to provide protection to
those who breed,  develop,  or discover them,  and thereby promote  progress in  agriculture  in  the  public interest.
29THE  PATENT  ISSUE  merely  because  it is  'alive'  . . . from the  stand-
point of construing  the patent statutes we do not
The  basic  issue  underlying  the  PVPA  is  see  ...  any sound reason for making the distinc-
whether patents on  life forms,  specifically  those  tion  . . . here  between  the living and  the  dead"
awarded to developers  of new plant varieties,  re-  ("The Case Against Patenting Life,"  1979, p.  4).
sult in a loss of genetic diversity and increase the  The  Supreme  Court,  considering  an  appeal,
tendency  for significant  economic  concentration  upheld  the decision  of the  lower court by  a vote
among  a  few  firms  in  the  seed  industry  (U.S.  of 5 to 4 to grant the patent for a  microorganism
Congress,  House  Committee  on  Agriculture,  created  for use  in cleaning  accidental  oil  spills.
1979,  1980).  Briefly,  genetic  diversity  is  deter-  Considered a key case in the Court's Spring deci-
mined  by  the  extent  to  which  production  of  a  sions,  Chief Justice  Warren  Burger  stated  that,
specific crop is dependent upon one of a very few  "it was not the Court's business to thrash out the
varieties  of seeds.  The  economic  concentration  broader questions raised by critics of genetic en-
issue arises  from concerns  that patents impeded  gineering  ...  the opponents  present a gruesome
the  information  flow  in  the  marketplace,  create  parade of horribles.  ....  We are without compe-
barriers  to  entry,  and  enable  undue  price  en-  tence  to  entertain  these  arguments-either  to
hancement.  Patents  are  a  recognized  statutory  brush  them  aside as  fantasies  generated  by  fear
monopoly,  and  although  it  does  not  necessarily  of the  unknown  or to  act  on  them.  The  choice
follow  that  statutory  monopolies  must  also  be  . . . is  a  matter  of  high  policy  for  resolution
market  monopolies,  it  is nevertheless  a continu-  within  the  legislative  process  after  the  kind  of
ing  concern.  The  issue  also  assumes  an  even  investigation,  examination,  and study  that legis-
broader  context:  the  desirability of granting  pat-  lative  bodies  can  provide  and  courts  cannot"
ents  on life forms of any kind.  (Burger,  1980,  p.  158).
Three  recent  events have  converged  to  make  The third event relates to the current examina-
this  a topical  social  issue.  The  first  is  the  pro-  tion of the structure  of agriculture  and the possi-
posed amendments  to the  1970 PVPA (Plant Va-  ble  ramifications  of the PVPA.  The  concern  for
riety  Protection  Act,  1980).  (P.L.  96-574  made  economic  concentration  and other adverse  soci-
several  changes  most of which are  not substan-  etal  effects  was  stated  by  Cary  Fowler  of  the
tive,  intended  only  to  clarify  the  Act.)  The  two  National Sharecroppers Fund in a letter to Secre-
most  significant  amendments  would:  (1)  delete  tary of Agriculture  Bob  Bergland:  "The  type of
from  the  Act  section  144,  which  states,  "The  seed grown and their characteristics  is one of the
provisions  of this  Act  shall  not  apply  to  the  most crucial factors affecting the structure of ag-
seeds, plants,  or transplants of okra, celery, pep-  riculture.  Some  varieties  lend  themselves  to
pers,  tomatoes,  carrots,  and  cucumbers."  This  large,  mechanized  farming systems.  Others liter-
would broaden the list of eligible  plants from 222  ally,  can  be  grown  only  by  small  farmers"
to 228;  (2) extend the life of patents from  17 to 18  (Fowler,  1980, p.  1).  Fowler also pointed out that
years; the  extension  would  harmonize  coverage  types  of seeds  determine  differences  in produc-
with  European  laws,  thus  enabling  the  United  tion  inputs  required  (such as  amounts  of water,
States  to  enter  the  International  Union  for the  pesticides,  and  fertilizers)  and  in the  nutritional
Protection  of New Plant Varieties  (UPOV).2 characteristics  of the  product obtained.
The  second  event  is  litigation  decided  by  the
Supreme  Court  in  June,  1980.  That  case  stems
from patents issued  by the Court of Customs and  LEGISLATIVE  HISTORY
Patent  Appeals  on  March  28,  1979,  to  the Gen-
eral  Electric  Corporation  and  Upjohn  Pharma-  The  Plant Patent  Act  (Plant Patent Act,  1930)
ceuticals  for  genetically  engineered  life  forms  provides  for  the  patenting  of certain  types  of
(the  manipulation  of genes,  which  transmit  he-  asexually reproduced  plants,  with  the  intent  to
redity  in  cells,  to  create  new  organisms)  ("The  foster plant breeding and the development of new
Case  Against  Patenting Life,"  1979).  The Patent  types  of crops  with  desirable  characteristics.  It
and  Trademark  Office  had  refused  to  grant pat-  did  not  cover  plants  that  were  sexually  repro-
ents  arguing  that  Congress  never  intended  that  duced.  Seeking  to  extend  the  coverage,  the
forms of life be patentable under the existing Pat-  American  Seed  Trade  Association  (ASTA)  in
ent Law (35 U.S.C.  101).  However, the Court of  1961  appointed  a  Breeders'  Rights  Study  Com-
Customs  and  Patent  Appeals  held  that  "there  mittee  to  investigate  the ways  and means  of ac-
was no justification for  excluding an  'invention'  complishing  this  (U.S.  Congress,  House  Com-
2 UPOV,  the  International  Union  for the Protection  of New  Plant  Varieties,  is an  intergovernmental  organization  whose  headquarters  is  in Geneva,  Switzerland.  It is
affiliated  by an agreement  of cooperation with  the World  Intellectual  Property  Organization,  a specialized  agency of the  United Nations system concerned  with protecting
patents, trademarks,  copyrights, and other kinds of intellectual  property.  UPOV provides protection  of new varieties of plants by granting plant breeders' rights,  either in the
form of a patent or a special title of protection,  or by  both. It began in  1961,  and  now has  12 member nations.  Considerable concern has arisen  that membersip  in UPOV will
make patent enforcement  a serious  issue.  This concern emerges  from  the European  Economic  Community  (EEC) Common  Catalogue,  a legislative  attempt to  standardize
vegetable products  marketed  in  the  EEC.  It  is  termed  a preventive  measure,  to  help  keep  patent  infringement to  a  minimum,  since  cultivation  of excluded  varieties  is
punishable by  fines.  While the  Common  Catalogue is  not sanctioned  by  UPOV, there  is  still some  question  whether  membership  in  UPOV will  lead  to a catalogue  in  the
United States.  Furthermore,  since the EEC  adopted the Common Catalogue,  hundreds of seed  varieties have  been declared illegal;  this, they are no  longer offered for sale
and  are disappearing.  Several studies  by  genetic  research centers  speculate  that by  1991,  nearly three-quarters  of all  European  vegetable  varieties will  be extinct.
30mittee  on  Agriculture,  1970).  Subsequently,  think it  should be strengthened  via amendments,
legislation  to  amend  the  1930  Act  was  pro-  while opponents  question even whether  it is  de-
posed-to insert the words  "or sexually"  in sec-  sirable to grant patents in this area, and, as such,
tions  161  and  163  after  the  words  their position contains the broad  spectrum of ar-
"asexually"-with  the  effect  of  enlarging  the  guments.
class of patentable plants (U.S.  Congress,  House  The  concept  of patenting  a  variety  of a good
Committee  on  Agriculture,  1970).  The  Depart-  that is implicitly considered to be publicly owned
ment  of Agriculture  under  Secretary  Orville  touches a "raw nerve"  in many people;  it evokes
Freeman opposed the amendment on the grounds  an  emotion  that  transcends  social  and  profes-
that  "it would threaten  the  continued existence  sional strata. In particular,  the fear is that patent-
of its long standing programs for  developing and  ing  plants  is  a dangerous  precedent  to  patenting
introducing new varieties of seeds and it is scien-  more  sophisticated  life  forms,  as  in the  case  of
tifically  and  legally  unsound."  (U.S.  Senate,  General  Electric's  microorganism.  As  a  corol-
Senate  Committee  on  the  Judiciary,  1968,  p.  lary,  the argument is  often extended to any type
715).  After  consideration,  the  Senate  Judiciary  of patenting  since  (except  for  literary  contribu-
Subcommittee  on  Patents,  Trademarks,  and  tions) all inventions  are,  at the extreme,  merely
Copyrights  voted  not to report  the bill.  improvements  on  existing  natural  materials.  In
A  major reason  for failure  of the  amendment  fact, this was the basis for Chief Justice Burger's
appears  to  have  been  disagreement  over  the  position  in  favor  of  General  Electric  (Burger,
feasibility of achieving plant protection for  sexu-  1980).
ally  reproduced  plants  through  the  1930  plant  Proponents  of the  PVPA  and  the  proposed
patent statute.  In fact, patenting  for sexually  re-  amendments  include  government  and  industry,
produced plants was viewed by many to be sepa-  with  arguments  based  largely  on  the  need  for
rate from other patents because  it involved a life  economic  incentives  to  induce  private  research
form,  and  that  such  unusual  inventions  should  and development.3 They contend  that plant pro-
thus  be  treated  by  new  laws  (U.S.  Congress,  tection  will:  (1)  greatly  stimulate  private  plant
House  Committee  on Agriculture,  1970).  breeding  research;  (2)  allow  agricultural  experi-
The ASTA managed to get the issue resurfaced  ment  stations to increase  needed basic research;
in  1969  with  new  legislation,  which  eventually  (3) permit public  expenditures  for  applied  plant
became the Plant Variety Protection  Act of 1970  breeding  to  be  diverted  to  important  areas  that
(Plant  Variety  Protection  Act,  1970).  The  even-  industry  might not pursue;  (4)  give  farmers  and
tual  Act  was  the  product  of substantial  com-  gardeners  more varietal choice,  and higher yield-
promise  in  language  and  intent.  The  purpose  of  ing,  better quality  varieties;  (5)  make  American
the  Act is  "to issue  'certificates  of plant variety  agricultural  products  more  competitive  in world
protection'  assuring developers of novel varieties  markets;  (6)  provide  benefits  to  consumers  of
of sexually reproduced  plants of exclusive  rights  crops  and  crop-products,  either  through  im-
to  sell,  reproduce,  import  or  export  such  vari-  proved  quality  or  greater  production;  and,  (7)
eties or use them in the production of hybrids for  foster  continued  breeding  of  new  varieties  by
a period  of  17  years"  (Plant  Variety  Protection  university experiment  stations, which can license
Act,  1970,  p.  1).  The effect was establishment of  them  to  seed  companies  for  a  share  of the  pro-
a  patenting  system  for  sexually  reproduced  ceeds.  Vegetable processors  who objected  to the
plants.  However,  due to the opposition by major  PVPA  in  1970  now  support  the  Act  and  the
vegetable  processors,  six vegetables,  okra,  car-  amendments.  Their  initial  objections  were  that
rots,  cucumbers,  tomatoes,  celery,  and peppers,  patent  protection  would  cause  prices  of  these
were  excluded  (U.S.  Congress,  House  Commit-  vegetables  to  increase  tremendously.  They  ap-
tee  on Agriculture,  1970).  parently  do  not feel  that  this  has occurred,  and
The Plant Variety Protection  Office in the Ag-  thus  decided  to  support  the  inclusion  of the  six
ricultural  Marketing  Service  (AMS)  of  USDA,  vegetables
established  under the authority  of the  1970  Act,
(Plant Variety Protection  Act,  1970) proposed  in  AU  V is onal,  Unied  beneficial  by prop  s 
1979 the most recent amendments  to  the PVPA.  plant  pr  ti  ons.  Pron  enefil  proponents  of
Consideration  of the  amendments  provided  a  plant  protection.  Proponents  assert  that  UPOV Consideration  of  the  amendments  provided  a
forum  for  renewed  opposition  to  the  Act  itself,  ebeshi  ill  assure  extended  protection
allowing  the economic,  moral,  and social  propri-  eneft  Whil  membership  in  UPOV  does  not
ety of the original  Act to  again be questioned.  ive  pent  holders  proection  in  member  na- tions,  members  may apply  for patent protection
PATENTING  LIFE  FORMS:  under common  by-laws  adopted  by  the member
THE  ARGUMENTS  '  nations.  Furthermore,  member  nations  are  re-
quired  to  establish  a  system  of rights  for plant
The  nexus  of the  issue  over  the  proposed  breeders.  In  the  United  States,  plant  rights  are
amendments  to  the  1970  Act  is  that proponents  administered by the Patent and Trademark  Office
3
USDA,  the American  Seed Trade  Association,  private seed  companies,  the  North Carolina  Crop Improvement  Association, the  American Patent Law  Association, the Nurserymen's  Assocation,  and  the  U.S. Departments  of State and  Commerce.
31and the USDA's Plant Variety Protection Office.  TABLE  1.  Some  Recent  Seed  Company  Ac-
The  intent  is  to  streamline  international  bureau-  quisitions
cratic  procedures  by  a  homogeneous  set of pro-
visions  designed  to protect  breeder's  rights  and  New Owner  Seed  Company  Date  Acquireda
facilitate  the transfer of technology  of new vari-  Celaese  Cepril  . 9
eties  without  regard  for  geographical,  legal,  or  Josepheis  1976
political  boundaries.  Ceneral  Soya  O's  Gold  Seed  1976
Parties  opposed  to  plant  protection  include  Ciba-Geigy  Funk  Seeds  terational  1976
Stewart Seeds  NA groups  representing  various  environmental,  re-  Louisiana  Seed  1979
search,  technological,  and  consumer  interests,  Garden  roducts  Gurney  Seeds  1970
the  Foreign  Agricultural  Organization  (FAO),  international  Multifoods  Baird  Inc  NA
and  various  social  and  genetic  scientists  in  uni-  Lyk  Brothers  1972
versities  across  the country.4
ITb  rpe  Seeds  197
Arguments  opposing  plant  protection  range  Kleinwanzieberer  Swatzucht  AG  Coker's  Pedigreed  Seed  Co.  1977
NAPB (Olin  &  Royal  Dutch  Shell)  Agripro  Inc.  1973 from  broad  philosophical  and  moral  arguments,  Tekseed-Hybrid  1974
to  allegations  concerning  detrimental  economic  Occidental  Petrolem  Ring-Around  Products  1975
impacts,  such  as  concentration,  loss  of informa-  Pioneer  Hi-Bred  Lankhart  NA
tion exchange,  and higher seed prices (U.S. Con-  hs  keet  co. tion  prices  Arnold  Thomas  Seed  Co.  1975
gress,  House  Committee  on  Agriculture,  1979,  Pfizer  Clemens  Seed  Farms  1975
Jordan  Wholesale  Co.  1975 1980).  Underlying this  opposition  is  concern  for  Trjan  Seed  197 5
the preservation of genetic  variability. The oppo-  Warick  eeds  1975
sition  to  plant  protection  varies  in  intensity.  '""  iulting  Hybrids  1977
There are those (such as the National Sharecrop-  A  Jacqes  eed  1970
pers  Fund)  who  adamantly  contend  that  the  SdNorthru-Kig  1975
PVPA  directly  results  in  an  irrevocable  loss  of  Rogers  Bros.  1975
genetic  diversity,  leads  to  a legalization  of  mo-  idreefield  Seed  1978
nopoly  in the  seed industry,  and is  a dangerous  Tate  &  Lyle  Berger  &  Plate  NA
precedent  for  extending  patents  to  other  life  Tejon  Ranch  Co.  Waterman-Loomis  Inc.  1977
forms. At the other end of the spectrum are those  Union  Carbide  Keystone  Seed  1977
who  feel  that  plant protection  is  a  contributing  Upjohn Pharmaceutical  Associated  Seeds  1972
factor  to  the  situations  noted  above,  but  by  noArw  eeds  1
means,  the sole  cause.  This group proposes that  Source:  Fowler,  Cary.  Graham Center Seed Directory,
the burden of proof, insofar as plant patent legis-  North Carolina,  1979.
lation  has  negative  social  or  economic  implica-  a Date  acquired  is approximate;  obtained  in conversation with ASTA,  April 22,  1980. tions,  be borne by  advocates of plant protection  b  I.T.T.  also owns 0. M. Scott & Sons,  acquired in  1964.
legislation,  while the former would prefer repeal
of all such legislation.
Thus,  it  would  seem  that,  underlying  all  the  following  scenario  as  a possible justification  for
various  arguments  surrounding  the  PVPA  and  opponents'  concern for growing concentration in
proposed amendments,  there  are really two cen-  the  seed  industry:  the  opportunity  for  vertical
tral underlying issues-the  economic  concentra-  and horizontal  integration,  as well as  diversifica-
tion of the  industry  and the  loss of genetic  vari-  tion,  presents itself in this  situation.  Seeds,  fer-
ability.  These  are further examined  below.  tilizer,  and pesticides  are all marketed  similarily
and  simultaneously.  Acquisition  of  seed  com-
panies  by firms  selling  the  other  inputs  can  re-
ECONOMIC  CONCENTRATION  duce  costs  while  expanding  markets  for  these
IN  THE  SEED  INDUSTRY  firms.  In  some  instances,  fertilizers  and  pesti-
cides are  complements  for  seeds.  For example,
Since  1970,  a  number  of independent  seed  seeds  producing  a  high  yield  per  acre  but with
firms have been purchased  by large (some  multi-  inadequate  resistance  to  disease  will  require
national)  corporations,  many  of  whom  are  in-  more pesticide.  Another reason for acquisition of
volved  in the agrichemical  and/or petrochemical  seed companies lies in the potential for seed coat-
business.  Some  of  the  recent  acquisitions  are  ing and pelleting.  The seed thus becomes a deliv-
shown in Table 1. As evidence supporting  allega-  ery  system for chemicals  and  biologicals  to the
tions of economic concentration,  however, this is  field.  Additionally,  research  may  be coordinated
liable to be charged  as being only circumstantial,  among  these inputs  in  a more effective  and effi-
since the intent of acquisition is not explicit,  and  cient  manner.  Finally,  membership  in  UPOV
the  dates of acquisition  are  coincidental  with the  would  extend  breeders'  rights  to  member  na-
passage of the PVPA. Nevertheless,  consider the  tions. If a firm  acquiring  a seed company  is mul-
4The  National  Sharecroppers  Fund,  the  Consumers  Federation  of  America,  the  National  Center of Appropriate  Technology,  the  Environmental  Defense  Fund,  the
Environmental  Policy Center,  and the  People's Business  Commission.  In addition, the  National  Farmers  Union  and the  National Association  for Gardening  urged  further
study  of the act prior to passage  of the amendments.
32tinational,  membership  in  UPOV  could  poten-  which  market  share  information  is  available.
tially "homogenize"  its markets, enabling the es-  Two firms,  Pioneer and Dekalb,  have controlled
tablishment  of  a  system  that  transcends  geo-  about  half  of this  market  for  several  years-
graphic  boundaries.  This scenario would  suggest  46 percent of the sales  in  1979 and 45 percent  in
that the seed industry  could be  a catalyst for ex-  1973.  When the market shares of the next 6 lead-
panding  seed and agricultural  chemicals  markets  ing  firms  are  included,  (Funk,  Trojan
in developing countries,  as well as domestically.  Northrup-King,  Golden  Harvest,  PAG,  and
However,  there  may  be  other reasons  for  ac-  Jacques)  the  8 leading  firms  account for  69 per-
quisition of seed companies.  One is the declining  cent of the market,  a decline  from  74 percent  in
value of the dollar, enticing foreign based corpo-  1973  (Miller,  1980).  The  annual  market  shares
rations  to "buy American."  Another  stems from  from  1973 to  1979 for the leading firms are shown
the consequences  of the U.S. tax laws. "A study  in  Table  2,  and  n-firm  concentration  ratios  in
of  the  widely  published  list  of  seed  companies  Table  3.
which have been acquired shows that 20 out of 27  From  1971  through  1975,  expenditures  for
companies  listed  were  owned  and  operated  by  seeds  and plants  rose  by  114  percent.  For  1976
individual  proprietors  or a  closely  held partner-  through  1980  (estimated),  the  increase  is  ex-
ship.  In  these  cases,  the  tax  structure  of aging  pected  to  be  57  percent.  For  the  decade  as  a
owners was a primary consideration in the sale of  whole,  expenditures  for  seeds  will  have  in-
the  company.  ...  Some  bad  legislation  in  the  creased  236 percent.  The  annual increase  in ex-
form of gift taxes,  death duties  and capital  gains  penditures  for seeds  from  1971  through  1980  is
taxes  sometimes  puts  extreme  pressure  upon  a  13.6 percent.
family  business  to  sell  out ..  . [leading  to  the  If the rise in seed expenditures is due primarily
conclusion]  that the basic reason for the merger  to  industry  growth, then the charge  that patents
and  sale of seed companies  has been  due to  the  have  led  to  higher  seed  prices  is  somewhat
U.S.  tax laws"  (Seed Trade  News,  1980,  p.  13).  weakened.  The tremendous  rise in seed expendi-
While  this  may  explain  why  some  seed  com-  tures  is  not  attributable  to  growth  alone,  how-
panies are sold, it does not offer any explanation  ever. More than half the increase in expenditures
of why  they  are  purchased.  Although  the latter  results from increases  in seed prices.  Therefore,
reason has been discussed by advocates  of plant  changes in the structure of the seed industry  may
protection,  there  has  been  little,  if any,  discus-  also be  shown by examining  data on  seed prices
sion of the international  capital  flow question.  (Table  4).  While  expenditures  for  all seeds  rose
236 percent from  1971 to 1980, the price of hybrid
corn  during  the  same  period  rose  142  percent,
INDUSTRY  STRUCTURE  AND  ECONOMIC  winter wheat  177 percent, soybeans  146 percent,
CONCENTRATION  winter barley  116 percent,  spring barley  205 per-
cent, and  sorghum 87 percent  (USDA,  1979).
In an  effort  to  clarify  some  of the  arguments  F  P  a  F  F 
concerning  economic  concentration  in the  seed  ces  sectcdes,  heriie,  ad  f  iies
industry,  the  following  section  examines  some  (insecticides,  herbicides,  and  fungicides), industry,  the  following  section  examines  some  like seeds,  account  for a relatively  small portion
aspects of the  structure and concentration  in the  l  ike  seds, account for a relatively  sma  portion
farm  seed,  farm  pesticide,  and  fertilizer  indus-  of total  production  costs-for  1980,  3.5  percent
trm see  r  esiie  a  eriier  i  s  ($2.8  billion)  of current  operating  expenses  and tries.
By  looking  at  growth  in  expenditures  and
prices of related  input  industries,  perhaps  some  T  r  r  r  r  TABLE  2.  Market  Shares for Corn of Leading light can  be shed on the question of undue price  Seed  Companies  1973-1979
enhancement in the seed industry.  That is,  argu-
ments  against  plant  patent  legislation  on  the
grounds  that  it leads  to significantly  higher  seed  Firm  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979
prices can be more clearly evaluated if changes in  --------------------------  Percent  ------------
seed prices and expenditures  are seen in relation  Pioneer  23.8  25.5  24.6  27.3  30.9  26.2  32.9
to changes  in prices  and expenditures  of related  Dekalb  21.0  18.8  18.8  19.5  15.8  17.9  13.3
input industries.  Funk  8.8  9.4  8.9  9.2  6.4  8.1  6.7
Trojan  5.9  5.1  6.8  5.6  4.2  5.4  3.8
Northrup-King  6.1  4.5  4.7  3.4  3.8  3.3  3.8
Farm Seed Industry. The  farm  seed  industry  thrp-Kng  3.  2.  5  1.8  26  2.9  1.6
has  shown  remarkable  growth  in  recent  years.  Golden Harvest  ---  ---  1.8  2.4  2.5  3.1  2.9
Farmers spent an estimated $3.6 billion for seeds  Jacques  ---  1.3  1.7  2.0  1.9  2.1  2.7
and  plants  in  1980,  more  than triple  the  amount  Cargill  1.3  2.8  1.4  1.7  1.5  1.7  1.7
spent  in  1971  ($1.1  billion).  Seed  expenditures
account  for  4.1  percent  of  farmers'  current  Source: MillerAgrivertical  Unit, 1979and 1980, (The Miller
operating  expenditures  and  2.8  percent  of their  Publishing Company).  Sample sizes  varied from 25 to  33 per-
total production  costs (USDA,  1980b).  cent of total corn acreage.
The  market  for seed  corn  is  the  only  one  for 
33TABLE  3.  Concentration  Ratios for Seed Corn  to  1975.  However,  expenditures  for  1980 are ex-
Industry,  1973-1979  pected to  increase  25 percent over  1979.
Mre___S________________________The  growth of this industry can also be attrib-
oNumber  1.3  ^  ^  uted almost totally to price increases.  From  1971
Of  . ................... t  1975————————..........  . to 1975,  increases  in the price of fertilizer ranged
8  72.5  70.7  69.8  71.2  68.1  67.0  69.7  from a low of 55 percent for limestone,  to a high
7  71.2  69.4  68.1  69.4  66.2  64.9  67.7  of 347 percent for superphosphate.  From  1975 to
6  69.1  66.6  66.3  67.4  63.7  62.0  64.1  1978,  fertilizer  prices  fell-the  largest  decrease
5  65.6  63.3  63.8  65.0  64.1  58.9  60.5  was for  nitrogen  28,  a  31  percent  decline,  while
4  59.7  58.8  59.1  61.6  57.3  55.6  56.7  potash prices  decreased  only  6 percent.  Overall,
3  53.6  537  52.3  56.0  53.1  52.2  52.9  from 1971 to 1978,  fertilizer prices doubled, while
2  44.8  44.3  43.4  46.8  46.7  44.1  46.2
expenditures  increased by  140 percent.
Most fertilizer companies are owned by large, Source: Miller  Agrivertical Unit, 1979 and 1980, (The Miller  Most fertilizer  companies  are  owned  by large,
Publishing Company). Sample  sizes varied from 25  to 33 per-  diversified  corporations,  several  of whom  are
cent of total corn acreage.  major chemical or oil companies.  Within the fer-
tilizer  industry,  the  phosphate  industry  is  the
most  heavily  concentrated,  while  the  nitrogen
industry  is  the  least  concentrated  (USDA, TABLE  4.  Change in Seed  Prices,  1971-80oncentrated  (USDA,
19806).
What can be concluded  from this  brief review
Hybrid  Winter  Winter  Spring
Period  Corn  Wheat  Soybeans .Brley  Barley  Sorghum  of the  structure  of these  3  input industries?  The
ercent --------------------------  data do not suggest  that increased concentration
has occurred.  While expenditures for seeds have
19197  0  5  21  10  2  tripled over the decade,  so have expenditures for 1972-1973  14  11  7  15  5  5
1973 - 1974  3  142  68  60  18  6
197497  13  9  1  7  16  pesticides  and fertilizers.  In fact,  all 3 industries
1975 - 1976  46  (19)  11  3  34  28
1976 - 1977  -0-  (2)  (30)  9)  (7  3  demonstrate  parallel  and  relatively  comparable
1977  - 1978  10  (27)  76  (13)  (10)  9
1978:  1979  8  34  12)  9  (11)  5  changes  in  sales  growth  and  price  increases.
1979  - 1980 
a
6  25  4  15  41  (55
And,  there  is  no  known  evidence  of collusion;
1971 - 80  142  177  146  16  205  87  rather,  changes  in  fundamental  conditions
Average  Annual  perhaps explain the increases.  The leading  pesti-
Change  10  17.8  13.3  9.5  14.4  6.8  cide and  fertilizer industries  are  not involved  in
the  seed  industry,  except  in  one  instance.  The
a estimated  Ciba-Geigy  Corporation, which holds the leading
andie  1979,nmarket  position  in  herbicide  sales,  also  owns Source:  USDA,  Agricultural Statistics,  1972  and  1979,  three  seed  companies.  One  of  its  seed  com-
Washington, D.C.  three  seed  companies.  One  of  its  seed  com-
panies,  Funk  Seeds  International,  has  been  the
third  leading  seed  company  since  1973.  Other-
wise,  the  chemical  companies  involved  in  seed
2.5  percent  of  total  production  costs  (USDA,  development  are apparently  not  involved  in the
1980a).  pesticide  and fertilizer industries.
Expenditures  for  pesticides  in  the  past  ten  While  this cursory  examination would  suggest
years have nearly  tripled, rising from $1 billion in  that the  issuance  of patents  to  seed  companies
1971  to $2.8 billion in  1980.  Most of this increase  since  1971  does  not appear to  have  significantly
in expenditures  occurred  by  1975,  however.  In  influenced  market  position or  prices,  additional
fact, expenditures in  1976 decreased by almost $1  research  is  needed for a more  conclusive  deter-
billion  from  1975.  Nearly  all of  the  increase  in  mination.  If expenditures  for  seeds  are  traced
expenditures is due to higher prices, even though  back another  10 years  to 1960,  changes in expen-
price rises have been slight over the past 5 years.  ditures  of much  smaller  magnitudes  can  be  ob-
While  expenditures  increased  179  percent  over  served.
the  decade,  the  average  prices  of  insecticides  There  are  a number  of economic  factors  that
rose  105  percent,  fungicides  200  percent,  and  may  have jointly contributed  to  the  increase  in
herbicides  53 percent.  seed  prices  from  1960  to  the  present.  Patents
There are approximately 50 firms that produce  provide  a protected market which  may be a rea-
pesticides;  4 of these firms account for 50 percent  son  for  the  acquisition  of  seed  companies  by
of the market.  For herbicides, the 4 leading firms  large, diversified  corporations. The possibility  of
have  71 percent of the sales, and for insecticides,  patent legislation  first arose  in  1961;  maybe  be-
the 4 leading  firms have  46 percent  of the market  cause seed  companies  appeared  to be  an  attrac-
(USDA,  1980a).  tive investment providing a good return by patent
Expenditures  for fertilizers  have risen dramat-  protection.  The energy  crisis  in  the  early  1970s
ically since  1971,  from $2.4 billion to $8.3 billion  caused a major disruption in the economy.  Seeds
(estimated)  in  1980.  As  with pesticides,  most of  would  be  somewhat  affected  by  skyrocketing
the increase  in expenditures  occurred from  1971  energy prices  insofar  as resins,  coating,  and pel-
34leting  of seeds  are  affected.  Additionally,  with  TABLE  5.  Acreage,  Value,  and Varietal Varia-
seed  companies  owned  by petrochemical  corpo-  tion of Major Crops,  1969
rations,  to what extent can energy costs be inter-
nalized  and these  costs passed  on  to  subsidiary  cr  (mille)  (miln $)  Ves  vaitis 
seed  companies?  Finally,  since  patents  do offer  --  ----
protection,  it may be argued that the seed indus-  Bn  snp  0.3  99  70  3  76
Cotton  11.2  1,200  50  3  53
try  might  be  markedly  different  without  the  Ca  66.3  5,200  197
b
6  71
PVPA.  Without  PVPA,  would  there  have  been  Pea  4  32  15  9  96
acquisition of seed companies?  Without acquisi-  1°  449  14  4  5
. . **  Sorghum  16.8  795  NA  NA  NA tions,  what  kinds  of growth  and  increases  in  Soybean  42.4  2,500  62  6  56
Sugar  beet  1.4  367  16  2  42
prices might have occurred?  Would market share  se  ..ato  0.3  63  48  1  69
positions be the  same? 
Even answering  these questions would not an-  a Corn includes seeds,  forage, and  silage.
swer  the  question of desirability  of plant patent  b  released public inbreds  only.
legislation.  Is  the  performance  of  a  protected  NA  =  Not available.
market more or less desirable than a market func-  Source:  National  Academy  of  Sciences,  Genetic Vulner-
ability of  Major  Crops,  1972. tioning  without  patent  protection?  In  other
words, is  the market,  with PVPA,  doing a better
job of providing  society  the  amount,  kind,  and
quality  of food desired?  and  inefficiently  through  the  planter.  The
seeds  must germinate  and  grow  simultane-
ously,  or  they  leave  space  for  weeds  to
GENETIC  VARIABILITY  grow in the  row  where  the  cultivating  ma-
chine must  go  ...
A central element in this issue is the role of the
PVPA as a cause of the loss of genetic variability.  Crops  must be uniform  for harvesting.  To-
Is genetic variability  decreasing and, if so,  is this  matoes,  peas,  and  potatoes  must  ripen  at
a  significant threat to our food  supply?  the same time if they are to be machine  har-
Various  crop characteristics  considered  desir-  vested because  the  machine  cannot  distin-
able by farmers,  marketing agents, food retailers,  guish  between  a  green  tomato  and  a  ripe
and consumers converge to delimit the  search by  one.  . . . And  so  it  goes,  uniformityal-
plant  breeders  for parent materials.  Only  a  few  ways  uniformity"  (National  Academy,
varieties are likely to possess the desired charac-  1972,  p.  289).
teristics  at  any  particular  point  in  time.  Thus,
meeting the demands of society for more, better,  There  is  some  evidence  that  genetic  losses
and  less  costly  food  and  fiber  inevitably  de-  have occurred  and are continuing  to occur-the
creases  the genetic base of a crop.  As seeds  be-  question is whether or not the rate of genetic loss
come  more  uniform to  meet these demands,  this  is tolerable  and if PVPA has influenced this rate.
may,  in turn, increase  crop vulnerability  to pests  The narrow varietal base for the major field crops
and disease.  The National  Academy of Sciences  is  suggested by  the following  and by the data  in
has aptly  described this  situation:  Table  5:  (1) 71  percent of the nation's  corn acre-
age depends on just 6 varieties;  (2) the  1970 corn
"Clearly  the  market  wants  uniformity.  If  blight destroyed  nearly  one-fifth of the crop that
one  breeder or one  farmer  fails  to  provide  year;  (3)  wheat  stem rust took 65  percent of the
it, the  market will turn to  another that will  Durum wheat in 1953  and 75 percent in  1954, and
. . . the market is just as insistent on cost as  25 percent of the bread wheat crop in 1954; (4) 40
on uniformity.  The market wants to pay the  percent  of the  hard red winter wheat  acreage  is
lowest price.  If one farmer cannot sell it for  dependent  on  only  2  varieties  and  their deriva-
a price,  another  will.  tives;  and  (5)  soybeans  consist  of only  6  major
varieties.
Demands  for efficiency  are really  demands  Society  must  be  willing  to  trade  off  some
for  uniformity  in  a  different  guise.  The  amount  of  genetic  diversity  in  order  to  have
farmer  must  have  high-yielding  varieties.  more,  better,  and less costly  food and  fiber.  In-
Because  the  low-yielding  members  of  the  telligent  decisions  on  the  desired  extent  of the
plant population have been eliminated,  this  trade-off  requires  information  on  the  costs  and
too  means  uniformity.  The  farmer  must  benefits involved.  The benefits of uniformity  are,
substitute  machines  for men, but machines  as  described  above,  efficiency  in  production,
can't  think,  again  varieties  must  be  uni-  yield,  attractive  food, and reasonable  prices.  All
form....  these  factors  give  consumers  a  choice  in  the
market-the  ability  to choose from an abundant
Seeds  are  sown  by  machines.  These  too  supply,  in  a competitive  market,  at  reasonable
must  be  uniform  or  they  move  unevenly  prices.
35Ironically,  opponents  of plant  variety  protec-  environmental  pressure"  (Seed  Trade News,
tion fear that the very  attributes that society de-  1980,  p.  15).
sires  to maximize  may result  in choices  actually  The  research  needed  to  help  society  choose
becoming  more  limited  because  of the  inherent  between  these polar positions is  obvious.
risks of uniformity.  In  other words,  society  de-
sires some degree of uniformity for the benefits it
provides; but, after some point, uniformity could
result  in  decreased  or  more  uncertain  benefits.  SUMMARY
Opponents  of plant protection  argue that the ex-
tent of uniformity is dangerous.  In simple terms,  That  such  a  seemingly inconsequential  bill as
the  opponents  feel  that  the  marginal  cost  of  the  amendments  to  the  PVPA  could  arouse  so
monoculturing  is  increasing  relative  to  the  mar-  much controversy and debate is illustrative of the
ginal  benefits  derived.  Furthermore,  they  per-  complexities  involved in the policy process.  The
ceive plant protection  legislation  as  a contribut-  apparent  intent  of the  PVPA  and  the  proposed
ing  factor  toward  increasing  this  cost/benefit  amendments  is  to  increase  the  research  in  the
ratio. On the other hand, advocates  are cognizant  private  sector  by  offering  publicly  granted  eco-
of the  problems  and  risks  incurred  by  a  loss  of  nomic  incentives-patents.  The  degree  of  suc-
genetic diversity;  but they perceive  plant protec-  cess  of this  approach  has  produced  most of the
tion legislation  as a beneficial  contribution.  That  debate.  Some  opponents  have  also  questioned
is,  the marginal benefit of patents is  greater than  the  intent,  fearing  a  diminution  of publicly
the marginal cost or risk involved. As the Execu-  funded research.
tive  Vice-President  of ASTA  Dr.  Harold  Loden  Two conclusions  seem to emerge.  The  first is
perceives  the  situation:  "Farmers  want to  grow  that  a  definitive  or  quick resolution  is  unlikely,
the  variety that  makes the  highest yield.  Seeds-  despite passage  of the amendments  by the  Con-
men and breeders produce and sell the best vari-  gress. As global food needs continue to increase,
ety  possible.  Why  should  anyone,  including  a  as concern  for nutrition  as well as  abundance of
poor farmer,  be burdened  with the responsibility  food  supply  increases,  and  as  environmental
of growing  inferior varieties  to  maintain genetic  concerns  demand  more  attention,  policies  di-
diversity  at  the  expense  of higher  yield  to  his  rectly and indirectly  (such  as genetic variability)
family  and  others"  (Seed Trade News,  1980,  p.  affecting  the food supply will be more controver-
15).  sial issues.
Advocates  of  plant  protection  feel  that  the  The second conclusion is that a comprehensive
issue of genetic  variability will  arise irrespective  study  of the  several aspects  of this  issue is  sug-
of the  PVPA  and  that  is  can  be  resolved  even  gested in order to address  the primary questions
with  such  legislation.  Again,  a  view  of  ASTA:  raised by the Plant Variety Protection Act.  Chief
"Genetic  diversity and  variability  are preserved  Justice  Burger  stated  that  it is  incumbent  upon
in germplasm 5 banks  throughout the  world,  (in)  the  legislative  bodies  to  undertake  the  kind  of
seed storage  laboratories,  in genetic  stocks  pre-  investigation  and  examination  demanded  by
served by  seed companies,  (and  in) seeds  saved  these issues that the Court is incapable of provid-
by farmers for their own use  (which is  permitted  ing.  In fact,  the  Senate  Agriculture  Committee
by the PVPA) as well as (in) a reservoir of genetic  requested,  and  the Department  of Agriculture  is
diversity  in  the  wild.  There  is  even  a  genetic  currently  providing,  a  study  to  provide  some
variation  in  so-called  "finished"  varieties  that  clear  indication  of the  impact  of this  legislation
will respond and become  visible with changes  in  on  both the seed industry  and  society.
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